Deng Xiaoping’s Sichuan Grain Requisition and the CCP’s Propaganda Myth
Unveiling the Truth of “Systemic Oppression”
Deng Xiaoping is celebrated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as the “chief architect of reform,” hailed as the hero of China’s modernization. Yet, his policies, from the forced grain requisitions in Sichuan in late 1949 to the early 1950s, to later measures like family planning and agricultural taxes, exacted a devastating toll on Sichuan’s farmers: millions starved, families were shattered, and basic survival rights were stripped away. These acts of “systemic oppression” lacked legal basis and democratic process, contributing to 10-12 million deaths during the Great Leap Forward. While overseas anti-CCP movements focus heavily on the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the Sichuan famine remains largely overlooked. The CCP’s propaganda obscures Deng’s culpability to uphold its legitimacy narrative. This article examines the illegality of Deng’s grain requisitions, explores whether a U.S.-style common law system could have stopped such actions, and reveals why the Sichuan famine is ignored, aiming to dismantle the CCP’s glorified myth.
1.Deng Xiaoping’s Sichuan Grain Requisition: Illegal Plunder and Humanitarian Disaster
In late 1949, after the CCP seized Sichuan, Deng Xiaoping, as First Secretary of the Southwest Bureau, launched a massive grain requisition campaign to feed 600,000 PLA troops, nearly a million surrendered Nationalist soldiers, and 500,000 former regime officials. According to Modern China Studies (2009), in January 1950, a 2-million-strong requisition team swept through Sichuan’s villages and towns, collecting 2 million tons of grain under the pretext of “1949 public grain taxes”—far exceeding the needs of the 2 million troops and officials, accounting for over 30% of the province’s grain output. This amount was 30-50% higher than Nationalist-era levies and involved re-collecting grain already taxed in 1949, burdening Rivnan farmers with 50 kg per capita (against a yield of only 150 kg). Resistance erupted, with millions of farmers labeled as “bandit rebels” and suppressed by force, resulting in 2 million famine victims in Rivnan alone and widespread deaths from starvation.Deng’s stance was uncompromising, dismissing reports of famine from Rivnan officials like Li Dazhang and demanding compliance. This requisition not only fueled the new regime’s “primitive accumulation” but also set the stage for Sichuan’s long-term pattern of high grain levies and exports. During the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961), Sichuan’s grain requisitions soared to 6.01 million tons (1959, 49% of output), leaving farmers with just 139 kg/year (29.4 kg of rice), or 80 g of rice daily, contributing to 10-12 million non-natural deaths. As Mao’s deputy, Deng co-formulated the 1953 unified grain purchase policy and supported Li Jingquan’s radical enforcement, indirectly exacerbating the catastrophe. The 1949-50 requisitions laid the groundwork for this tragedy, underscoring Deng’s culpability.
2. The Illegality of Grain Requisition: No Law, No Democracy, No Property Rights
Was Deng’s grain requisition a “normal state action”? The answer is no. Modern rule-of-law states require taxes to be based on clear legal authority, approved by elected legislatures, and respect private property and due process. Sichuan’s 1949 requisition violated all these principles:
No Legal Basis: In 1949, the newly founded PRC lacked a constitution, and requisitions relied solely on administrative orders from the CCP Central Committee and Southwest Bureau, not codified law. Re-levying 1949 grain already collected by the Nationalists was outright extralegal.
No Legislative Approval: The Nationalist-era Sichuan legislature was dissolved, and the CCP established no elected bodies. Farmers had no representation, and 2 million requisition teams enforced policies through force, devoid of public consent.
No Democratic Process: Decisions were top-down, with no avenue for farmers to voice dissent. Resistance was crushed as “banditry,” and Deng ignored famine reports, reflecting authoritarian control, not democratic deliberation.
Disregard for Property Rights: The U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment prohibits uncompensated property seizures. Sichuan’s requisition stripped farmers of grain (even poor peasants were targeted), leaving insufficient food for survival, blatantly violating property rights.
In a U.S. common law system, Deng’s actions would be deemed illegal. Precedent-based law (e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1803) requires legal authority for state actions, and the Fifth Amendment bans uncompensated takings (Kelo v. City of New London, 2005). Jury trials would allow farmers to sue for damages, and independent courts could issue injunctions to halt abuses. In 1949 Sichuan, military control and lack of judicial recourse left farmers defenseless, epitomizing “systemic oppression.”
3. From Famine to Family Planning and Heavy Taxes: A Legacy of Systemic ViolenceDeng’s policies extended beyond requisitions.
While post-1978 reforms drove economic growth (9.5% annual GDP increase, 1978-2000), Sichuan farmers faced continued oppression:
Forced Family Planning: Deng’s “one child, no exceptions” policy (1980) made Sichuan a brutal enforcement zone. Over 60% of rural women underwent forced sterilizations in the 1980s, with slogans like “better rivers of blood than one extra birth.” Family structures were destroyed, accelerating aging (over 10% of Sichuan’s population was 60+ by 2000).
Agricultural Taxes and Fees: Deng’s “grain-first” policy sustained high levies (4 million tons annually in the 1980s), leaving farmers with 200 kg/year, mostly coarse grains. Taxes (5-10% of output) and rural fees drove farmers into poverty, with urban-rural income gaps widening (1985: urban 700 yuan, rural 300 yuan).
From famine (stripping survival rights) to family planning (denying reproductive rights) and taxes (seizing labor fruits), these policies formed a continuum of “systemic oppression.”
4. Why Overseas Anti-CCP Focuses on Tiananmen While Ignoring Sichuan’s Famine
Despite the Sichuan famine’s staggering toll (10-12 million deaths) dwarfing Tiananmen’s (hundreds to thousands), overseas anti-CCP movements prioritize the latter. Why?
Information Visibility: Tiananmen (1989) unfolded in Beijing with global media coverage, with images like the “Tank Man” galvanizing outrage. The Sichuan famine (1958-1961) was obscured by CCP censorship, mislabeled as a “natural disaster,” with sparse evidence until later studies (e.g., Yang Jisheng’s Tombstone).
Symbolism and Resonance: Tiananmen’s student victims symbolized democratic aspirations, resonating with Western values. Sichuan’s rural farmers, geographically remote, garnered less empathy.
Political Leverage: Tiananmen fuels calls for sanctions and diplomatic pressure. The distant famine lacks immediate policy impact, with complex archives (mostly in Chinese) limiting reach.
Resource Allocation: Anti-CCP groups focus on high-profile issues like Tiananmen or Hong Kong. Famine discussions on X in 2025 are roughly one-tenth of Tiananmen’s, reflecting limited traction.
Deng’s Tiananmen role (ordering the crackdown) is well-known, but his Sichuan culpability (1949-50 requisitions, backing Li Jingquan) is obscured by CCP propaganda and information barriers.
"Jingquan, food still needs to be taken away. The deaths can only be incurred in Sichuan, not in Beijing or Shanghai. If people die in Beijing or Shanghai, it will have a big international impact." These are basically Deng Xiaoping's original words.
5. CCP Propaganda and the Deng Xiaoping Myth
Why does the CCP venerate Deng? His reforms (lifting 800 million out of poverty) underpin its legitimacy, and Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” builds on this narrative. Propaganda via textbooks and CCTV glorifies Deng’s “Four Modernizations,” burying the famine, Tiananmen, and family planning atrocities. The Sichuan requisition is framed as a “nation-building necessity,” with deaths blamed on “natural disasters” or “local errors.” Criticizing Deng risks unraveling the CCP’s “economic miracle” story, threatening Xi’s legitimacy. CCP censors terms like “Tiananmen” and “famine” to suppress truth.
6. Conclusion and Call to Action
Deng Xiaoping’s 1949-50 Sichuan grain requisition was an illegal plunder, lacking legal basis, democratic process, or respect for property rights, causing 2 million famine victims and paving the way for the Great Leap Forward’s 10-12 million deaths. His later family planning and tax policies perpetuated “systemic oppression.” A U.S. common law system—through precedent, juries, and independent courts—would have halted such abuses. Overseas anti-CCP focus on Tiananmen overshadows the famine due to visibility and strategy, but Sichuan’s truth demands exposure. Let’s shatter the CCP’s Deng myth! Share data (1959 Sichuan rice: 80 g/day) and stories (e.g., Tombstone) on X with #AntiCCP #DengXiaopingCrimes. Research non-CCP sources like Modern China Studies (2009), honor the victims, and resist the lies! #ExposeCCP Myth #SystemicOppression
邓小平的四川征粮与中共宣传神话:揭开“制度压榨”的真相
邓小平被中共奉为“改革开放总设计师”,其形象被塑造成中国现代化的英雄。然而,1949年底至1950年初,他在四川主导的强制征粮运动,以及后续政策(如计划生育、农业税),却让四川农民付出了惨重代价:数百万人饥饿死亡,家庭破碎,生存权被剥夺。这些“制度压榨”行为不仅缺乏法律依据和民主程序,还导致了1950年代末大跃进期间的1000-1200万死亡。然而,海外反共运动更多聚焦1989年六四事件,四川饥荒却鲜为人知。中共通过宣传掩盖邓的罪责,维护其合法性叙事。本文将剖析邓小平在四川征粮的非法性,探讨美式普通法体系是否能制止此类行为,并揭示为何四川饥荒被忽视,旨在打破中共的“伟光正”神话。#反共 #揭穿中共神话 #制度压榨 #邓小平罪责一、邓小平的四川征粮:非法掠夺与人道灾难1949年底,中共占领四川后,邓小平作为西南局第一书记,立即组织大规模征粮运动,以满足60万解放军、近百万投降国民党军队和50万旧政权公职人员的粮食需求。文献显示,1950年1月,200万征粮工作队进入四川乡村和城镇,以“征收1949年公粮”为名,强制征收200万吨粮食,远超200万军队和公职人员的实际需求,占全省粮食产量的30%以上。这一征收量比国民党时期高出30-50%,且是对已由国民党征收过的1949年粮食的重复征收,导致川南地区人均粮食负担高达50公斤(当地产量仅150公斤/人)。农民因不堪重负发起反抗,数百万暴动被定性为“土匪叛乱”,遭武装镇压。结果,川南200万饥民涌现,“饿死人”现象遍布。邓小平对征粮态度强硬,拒绝接受川南负责人(如李大章)反映的饥荒困难,甚至点名批评,迫使其检讨。征粮运动不仅为新政权提供了“原始积累”,还奠定了四川长期高征购、高外调的模式。1950年代末大跃进期间,四川粮食征购量增至601万吨(1959年,占产量49%),农民人均留粮仅139公斤/年(大米仅29.4公斤),日均大米不足80克,直接导致1000-1200万非正常死亡。邓小平作为毛泽东的副手,参与制定统购统销政策(1953年起),并支持李井泉的激进执行,间接加剧了灾难。1949-50年的征粮为这一悲剧埋下伏笔,凸显邓的罪责。
二、征粮的非法性:无法律、无民主、无视财产权邓小平的征粮行为是否为“正常国家行为”?答案是否定的。在现代法治国家,税收需基于明确法律、经民选议会批准,并尊重私有财产和正当程序。1949年底的四川征粮却完全背离这些原则:
无法律依据:1949年中共国成立,无宪法,征粮仅基于中共中央和西南局的行政命令,而非成文法律。重复征收1949年公粮(已由国民党收过)更是法外掠夺,违背法治原则。
无议会批准:四川旧议会已解散,中共未建立任何民选机构,农民无代表参与决策。200万征粮工作队直接入村,依靠武力推行,毫无民意基础。
无民主程序:征粮决策自上而下,农民无法表达异议,反抗被镇压为“土匪”。邓小平漠视川南饥荒报告,显示其独断作风,与民主协商背道而驰。
无视私有财产:美国宪法第五修正案保护私有财产,禁止未经补偿的征收。四川征粮无偿剥夺农民粮食(贫雇农亦受波及),导致生存危机,彻底违背财产权原则。
在美式普通法体系下,邓的征粮将被判定为非法。判例法(如Marbury v. Madison, 1803)要求行政行为有法律依据,第五修正案禁止无补偿征收(Kelo v. City of New London, 2005)。陪审团制度可让农民通过集体诉讼表达诉求,独立司法可通过禁制令或赔偿制止滥权。1949年的四川却处于军事管制,农民无司法救济,凸显“制度压榨”的残酷性。
三、从饥荒到计生与重税:制度暴力的延续邓小平的政策并未止于征粮。1978年后的改革开放虽带来经济增长(1978-2000年GDP年均增9.5%),但四川农民继续承受压迫:
强制计划生育:邓小平力推“一个不少、一个不留”的独生子女政策(1980年起),四川成为最严酷执行地。1980年代,60%+农村妇女被强制结扎,部分地区强制堕胎率超30%,以“血流成河”为口号,摧毁家庭结构,加剧老龄化(2000年四川60岁以上人口超10%)。
农业税与杂费:邓的“以粮为纲”延续高征粮(1980年代年均400万吨),农民留粮仅200公斤/年(多为杂粮)。农业税(占产值5-10%)、乡统筹费等让农民“越种越穷”,城乡收入差距扩大(1985年四川城镇700元/人,农村仅300元)。
这些政策从饥荒(剥夺生存权)到计生(剥夺生育权)、重税(剥夺劳动果实),构成对农民的系统性压迫,验证了“制度压榨”的本质。
四、为何海外反共聚焦六四而忽视四川饥荒?尽管四川饥荒死亡人数(1000-1200万)远超六四(数百至数千),海外反共运动却更关注后者,原因如下:
信息可见性:六四(1989)发生在北京,西方媒体实时报道,“坦克人”影像震撼全球。四川饥荒(1958-1961)因中共封锁信息(归为“自然灾害”),海外缺乏影像和实时证据。
象征性与共鸣:六四受害者多为学生,代表民主诉求,契合西方价值观。四川农民的苦难因地理偏远和身份差异,难获共鸣。
政治杠杆:六四被用作批评中共专制的标志,易推动制裁或外交压力。饥荒历史久远(60余年),档案多为中文,传播受限。
资源分配:海外反共资源有限,聚焦六四、香港等高知名度事件。饥荒研究(如杨继绳《墓碑》)传播范围小,难成主流。
邓小平在六四中的镇压角色(下令戒严)广为人知,但在四川饥荒的责任(1949-50年强征、支持李井泉)却因信息壁垒和中共宣传被淡化。X平台数据显示,2025年六四相关帖子约10倍于饥荒讨论,凸显关注度差距。
“井泉啊,粮食还得调,死人也只能死我们四川的人,不能死北京的人,也不能死上海的人。如果北京、上海死人国际影响就大了。”基本上是邓小平的原话
五、中共宣传与邓小平神话中共为何维护邓小平形象?其改革开放成就(8000万脱贫)是中共合法性的支柱,习近平的“中国梦”依赖这一叙事。宣传机器通过教科书、央视纪录片美化邓的“四个现代化”,掩盖饥荒、六四、计生暴行。四川征粮被淡化为“建政需要”,死亡归咎“自然灾害”或“地方偏差”。否定邓将动摇中共“经济奇迹”叙事,威胁习近平的执政根基。CCP审查“天安门”“饥荒”等词,确保真相被压制。
六、结论与行动号召
邓小平1949-50年的四川征粮是非法掠夺,无法律依据、无民主程序、无视财产权,导致200万饥民和死亡,为大跃进的更大灾难(1000-1200万死)埋下伏笔。其后续的计生和重税政策延续了“制度压榨”。美式普通法体系(判例法、陪审团、独立司法)将通过司法审查和民意制约制止此类行为,凸显中共体制的专制本质。海外反共聚焦六四而忽视饥荒,源于信息壁垒和策略选择,但四川的真相亟需曝光。让我们打破中共对邓的神话!
“大跃进”时期四川省大饥馑的特殊成因:https://www.modernchinastudies.org/us/issues/past-issues/103-mcs-2009-issue-1/1081-2012-01-05-15-35-41.html
陈振寰:四川与大饥荒 https://hx.hxwk.org/2017/05/03/%E9%99%88%E6%8C%AF%E5%AF%B0%EF%BC%9A%E5%9B%9B%E5%B7%9D%E4%B8%8E%E5%A4%A7%E9%A5%A5%E8%8D%92/